One approach to representing knowledge or belief of agents, used by economists and computer scientists, involves an in nite hierarchy of beliefs. Such a hierarchy consists of an agent's beliefs about the state of the world, his beliefs about other agents' beliefs about the world, his beliefs about other agents' beliefs about other agents' beliefs about the world, and so on. (Economists have typically modeled belief in terms of a probability distribution on the uncertainty space. In contrast, computer scientists have modeled belief in terms of a set of worlds, intuitively, the ones the agent considers possible.) We consider the question of when a countably in nite hierarchy completely describes the uncertainty of the agents. We provide various necessary and su cient conditions for this property. It turns out that the probability-based approach can be viewed as satisfying one of these conditions, which explains why a countable hierarchy su ces in this case. These conditions also show that whether a countable hierarchy su ces may depend on the \richness" of the states in the underlying state space. We also consider the question of whether a countable hierarchy su ces for \interesting" sets of events, and show that the answer depends on the de nition of \interesting".
1 Introduction beliefs of agent i are modeled by a probability distribution on the possible states of nature; for each natural number m 1, the (m + 1) st -order beliefs of agent i are modeled by a probability distribution on the possible states of nature and the other agents' m th -order beliefs (together with some consistency conditions described in MZ85, BD93] ). An agent's type is his in nite hierarchy of beliefs. We de ne a belief structure to consist of a state of nature and a description of each agent's type. Given a set S of states of the world, we take B(S) to be the set of belief structures where S is the set of states of nature.
In belief structures, knowledge is identi ed with \belief with probability 1". That is, roughly speaking, agent i is said to know an event E S in a given belief structure b if, according to agent i's type in b, event E is assigned probability 1 at level 1 of agent i's hierarchy. Similarly, agent i knows that agent j knows E if the event \agent j knows E" is assigned probability 1 at level 2 of agent i's type hierarchy. Finally, we say that E is common knowledge if all agents know E, all agents know that they know E, and so on.
We would like to think of a belief structure as describing a state of the world. It is not clear, however, that a belief structure is an adequate description of a state of the world. Even if we accept the doctrine that a state of the world can be adequately described by describing the actual state of nature and each agent's uncertainty about the state of nature and other agents' uncertainty (at all levels), it is not clear that the in nite hierarchy just described completely exhausts an agent's uncertainty. After all, an agent may have uncertainty as to the type of other agents. Harsanyi essentially assumed that there is an exogenously given probability distribution that describes each agent's probability distribution on the state of nature and the other agents' types. The key result proved in BE79, MZ85] is that the hierarchy described above does exhaust an agent's beliefs: an agent's type determines a unique probability distribution on the states of nature and the other agents' types.
This result also suggests that we can view the belief structures in B(S) as the states in an Aumann structure, since each one completely describes a state of the world. If we take that view, then we might hope that the de nitions of knowledge and common knowledge in Aumann structures and belief structures coincide. Unfortunately, this is not quite the case. Nevertheless, Brandenburger and Dekel BD93] show that these notions do coincide if we interpret knowledge in Aumann structures probabilistically. Thus, we view B(S) as an Aumann structure, with the information partitions being determined by the type (so that two belief structures b and b 0 are in the same equivalence class of K i i agent i has the same type in b and b 0 ). In addition, we endow B(S) with probability measures i (one probability for each agent i) based on information in the individual belief structures (for more details on the construction, see BD93] ). Suppose we identify the event E S with the subset of B(S) consisting of all belief structures for which the state of nature is in E. We then take the event \agent i knows E" to hold in state s if i (E j K i (s)) = 1; similar modi cations are necessary for common knowledge. Brandenburger and Dekel then show that an event E S is common knowledge in a state b in the (probabilistically endowed) Aumann structure B(S) i E is common knowledge in the belief structure b. A complementary result is proved in TW88], where it is shown that given an Aumann structure A = (S; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ) and s 0 2 S, there is a belief structure b 2 B(S) such that an event E S is common knowledge at s 0 i E is common knowledge in b.
This may seem to pretty much complete the picture: the hierarchical approach provides the answer to the problem of circularity in Aumann structures, since the above results seem to indicate that belief structures are adequate for modeling the states in Aumann structures. Unfortunately, the situation is somewhat more complicated than these results suggest. The fundamental problem with these results is that they are trying to relate two incomparable concepts of knowledge: the information-theoretic concept in Aumann structures and the probability-theoretic concept in belief structures (which is why Brandenburger and Dekel had to recast Aumann's framework in a probabilistic setting). The probabilistic framework masks some of the subtleties in the issue of the adequacy of the hierarchical approach. Thus, we examine the issue of the adequacy of the hierarchical approach here in a non-probabilistic setting.
A non-probabilistic setting for the hierarchical approach is described in FHV91]. (A precursor to this approach is described in EGS80].) We again start with a set S of states of nature (at \level 0") and build a hierarchy, level by level. In this case, the rst-order knowledge of agent i is a set of states of nature (which intuitively corresponds to the set of states the agent considers possible); the (m+1) st -order knowledge of agent i (for m 1) is modeled by a set of possibilities, each of which is a description of a state of nature and each agent's m th -order knowledge (again, certain consistency conditions must be satis ed). Intuitively, whatever is in the subset is considered to be possible, and whatever is not in the subset is known to be impossible. Note that there is no probability distribution, just a set of possibilities. A knowledge structure consists of a state of nature and, for each agent, a hierarchy consisting of that agent's m th -order knowledge, for each nite m 1. We take F(S) to be the set of knowledge structures, where S is the set of states of nature.
Knowledge and common knowledge are de ned in knowledge structures in an informationtheoretic fashion, as in Aumann structures. That is, agent i is said to know E S in a given knowledge structure if the set of states that i considers possible at level 1 is a subset of E; agent j knows that agent i knows E if the set of sequences of length 2 that j considers possible at level 2 is a subset of the set of sequences of length 2 where i knows E. Common knowledge is again de ned in the standard way in terms of knowledge.
In FHV91] , results connecting knowledge structures and Aumann structures analogous to those of BD93] and TW88] are proved. Namely, it is shown that we can view F(S) as an Aumann structure, where the partitions are determined by the agents' types, and an event E S is common knowledge in a knowledge structure f 2 F(S) according to Aumann's de nition i E is common knowledge at f according to the knowledge-structure de nition. Moreover, it is shown that given an Aumann structure A = (S; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ) and a state s 0 2 S, there is a knowledge structure f 2 F(S) such that an event E S is common knowledge at s 0 i E is common knowledge in f.
This seems to con rm the results of TW88, BD93] and suggest that the hierarchical approach does address the circularity problem. Unfortunately, it is also shown in FHV91] that knowledge structures are in general not an adequate description of the world, since they do not completely describe an agent's uncertainty. In particular, an agent's type does not determine what other types the agent considers possible. The problem is that the hierarchy in knowledge structures (as well as in belief structures) contain only ! levels, when in general we need to consider trans nite hierarchies. 2 In fact, Fagin Fag94] and Heifetz and Samet HS93, HS98] show independently that in general, no ordinal level in the hierarchy is su ciently large to describe completely an agent's uncertainty. We say more about this result in Section 7.
Why are knowledge structures not an adequate description of an agent's knowledge while belief structures are? And how do we reconcile the inadequacy of knowledge structures with the results relating knowledge structures to Aumann structures? Our goal in this paper is to address these questions by using the non-probabilistic framework of knowledge structures to examine the adequacy of hierarchical structures and to make precise how expressive they are.
We start by considering the question of when a knowledge structure does completely characterize 2 Trans nite hierarchies have levels that are indexed by in nite ordinals (or as they are often called, trans nite ordinals). For a discussion of trans nite ordinals, see almost any book on set theory and many books on logic, such as Sho67].
the agents' knowledge. More precisely, we consider (in Section 3) when it is the case that the rst ! levels of the hierarchy completely determine the rest of the hierarchy. We provide three necessary and su cient conditions for this to be the case. One surprising condition is that a knowledge structure completely characterizes the agents' knowledge i it characterizes the rst ! + ! levels of knowledge. A consequence of that is that in order to check if the rst ! levels of the hierarchy determine the rest of the hierarchy, it su ces to show that they determine the rst ! + ! levels of the hierarchy. Another consequence of this condition is that the adequacy of knowledge structures may depend on the \richness" of the states in the underlying state space S. If the states of nature are modeled in enough detail, then knowledge structures do characterize the agents' knowledge; otherwise, they may not.
In Section 4, we provide a di erent analysis of adequacy, one that sheds further light on why we can stop after ! levels in the probabilistic case. This analysis highlights the role of a certain limit-closure property, which says that what happens at nite levels determines what happens at the limit. Limit closure can be viewed as a continuity property. The probabilistic analogue to limit closure holds for belief structures, but only because we restrict attention to countably additive measures. If we allow probabilities that are only nitely additive, then the analogue to limit closure does not hold and, as we show, such belief structures do not in general completely characterize the agents' beliefs. That is, the results of BE79, MZ85] no longer hold once we consider probabilities that are only nitely additive.
Since knowledge structures do not, in general, characterize the agents' knowledge, we next consider the question as to whether knowledge structures characterize the agents' knowledge with respect to \interesting" sets of events.The answer, of course, depends on what is considered to be an \interesting" set of events. It turns out, for example, that if we consider only events that can be de ned from \natural events" by knowledge and common knowledge operators, then knowledge structures are adequate. If, on the other hand, we are interested in common knowledge among coalitions of agents (rather than just common knowledge among all the agents), then knowledge structures are not adequate. In this case, a trans nite hierarchy is necessary, but ! 2 levels su ce. Note that this result is quite di erent from that involving the ordinal ! + ! mentioned earlier.
The later result says that if all we care about are events that can be de ned from the base events and operators for \coalition" common knowledge, then ! 2 levels of the hierarchy su ce. The earlier result applies to arbitrary events, not just interesting ones, and shows that the rst ! levels determine the whole hierarchy i they determine the rst ! + ! levels of the hierarchy.
This discussion gives the impression that the only issue underlying the adequacy of the hierarchical approach is that of the \length" of the hierarchy. But it is easy to see that knowledge structures are also de cient in a way that no trans nite hierarchy can remedy. Aumann structures contain information about all conceivable states, even states that are commonly known not to hold. Thus, Aumann structures enable counterfactual reasoning, such as \If Ron Fagin were the President, then he would not have stopped the war against Iraq so soon." A counterfactual statement can be viewed as a statement about a world commonly known not to be possible. (It is presumably common knowledge that Ron Fagin is not the President.) Knowledge structures, on the other hand, do not enable such reasoning, since situations commonly known to be impossible never appear as pre xes in knowledge structures.
It turns out that this de ciency is not inherent in the hierarchical approach, but rather is the result of the manner in which this approach was used in knowledge structures. Knowledge structures were designed to model knowledge; no more, no less. As we show, the hierarchical approach can also be used to de ne structures that do capture information about conceivable states. These results suggest that hierarchical structures can always serve as adequate models of the world. In general, however, we may need to capture more than just knowledge and we may need to continue the hierarchy into the trans nite ordinals, in order to completely capture the agents' uncertainty. What we choose to capture and how far into the ordinals we need to go depends on the events that we are interested in capturing. Thus, the question of whether knowledge or belief structures as de ned are adequate models depends both on what features of the world we are trying to model, and on the events we are interested in describing.
In Section 2, we review knowledge structures and belief structures. In Section 3, we de ne what it means for a knowledge structure to characterize the agents' knowledge at a given level, and in particular for a knowledge structure to completely characterize the agents' knowledge. We give three necessary and su cient conditions for a knowledge structure to completely characterize the agents' knowledge, including the result that a knowledge structure completely characterizes the agents' knowledge i it characterizes the rst ! + ! levels of knowledge. We also give a simple su cient condition, which arises naturally in practice, that guarantees that a knowledge structure completely characterizes the agents' knowledge. In order to better understand how the characterization of knowledge in knowledge structures relates to the characterization of beliefs in belief structures, we present in Section 4 an alternative way of capturing the intuition of when a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' knowledge, in terms of the limit-closure condition mentioned above. We also show that belief structures no longer characterize the agents' beliefs if we consider probability measures that are only nitely additive. In Section 5, we consider whether it really is a problem when knowledge structures do not characterize an agents' knowledge, and show that this depends on the set of events we are interested in. In Section 6, we discuss how to modify knowledge structures to model counterfactual statements. In Section 7, we discuss some results related to those in this paper. In Section 8, we give our conclusions. In Appendix A, we give proofs of some theorems from Section 3, and in Appendix B, we give proofs of some theorems from Section 5.
2 Knowledge structures and belief structures: a review
In this section we review the de nitions of knowledge structures and belief structures. We begin with knowledge structures. The following material is largely taken from FHV91], slightly modi ed to be consistent with the rest of our presentation here. For the sake of generality, and since we will need these de nitions later, we de ne not just knowledge structures, but the more general \ -worlds" for ordinals ; knowledge structures are the special case where = !.
We start with a set S of states (of nature) and a xed nite set f1; : : : ; ng of agents. For each ordinal > 1 ( nite or in nite), we now de ne -worlds, by induction on . A 0th-order knowledge assignment f 0 is a member of S, that is, a state of nature (which, intuitively, corresponds to the \real world"). We call hf 0 i a 1-world (since its length is 1). Assume inductively that -worlds have been de ned for all with 1 < . Let W be the set of all -worlds, for < . If 1, then a th-order knowledge-assignment f is a function that associates with each agent i a set f (i) W of \possible -worlds"; we think of the worlds in f (i) as \possible" for agent i and the worlds in W ? f (i) as \impossible" for agent i. A -world is a sequence f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i of length such that for each < , we have that f is a th-order knowledge assignment and each -pre x (i.e., pre x of length ) is a -world. If is a limit ordinal, there are no further conditions on -worlds. If = 0 + 1 is a successor ordinal, there are further conditions. Note that in this case, a -world is a sequence f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : : ; f 0 i. Let us use f < to denote the -pre x of f. The conditions are: K1. Correctness: f < 0 2 f 0 (i). K2 . Introspection: If hg 0 ; g 1 ; : : :i 2 f 0 (i), then g (i) = f (i) for all with 0 < < 0 . K3. Extendibility: If 0 < < 0 , then g 2 f (i) i there is some h 2 f 0 (i) such that g = h < .
These conditions enforce some intuitive properties of knowledge. Intuitively, K1 says that each agent correctly takes the actual world to be one of the worlds he considers possible. By contrast, for belief, as opposed to knowledge, an agent can (incorrectly) believe that the actual world is not a possibility. K2 implies that agents are introspective about their own knowledge; at each level, they know exactly what they know and what they do not know at lower levels. Finally, K3 says that the di erent levels of knowledge describing a knowledge world are consistent with each other.
Let f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i be a -world. De ne agent i's type in f, denoted i (f), to be the sequence hf 1 (i); f 2 (i); : : :i. We write f i f 0 if i (f) = i (f 0 ), that is, if i has the same type in f and f 0 . De ne i's view (at f), denoted f i , to be fg j f i gg. Intuitively, i's view at f consists of the -worlds where i has the same knowledge as in f.
We are in particular interested in !-worlds, which we refer to (following FHV91]) as knowledge structures. Thus, a knowledge structure describes knowledge of arbitrary nite depth. We use F(S) to denote the set of knowledge structures over S. We now de ne knowledge in knowledge structures. Let w be a k-world. We say that agent i considers w possible in a knowledge structure f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i if w 2 f k (i). A k-ary event (or k-event, for short) is a set of k-worlds. Thus, a 0-event is an assertion about the state of nature, as it is essentially a subset of the set S; a 1-event is an assertion about the state of nature and the agents' knowledge of the state of nature; a 2-event is an assertion about the state of nature, the agents' knowledge of the state of nature, and the agents' knowledge of the agents' knowledge of the state of nature; and so on. Agent i knows a k-event E in f if all the k-worlds agent i considers possible in f are in E, that is, if f k (i) E. This de nition of knowledge has the same information-theoretic avor as the de nition of knowledge in Aumann structures given in the introduction.
Belief structures are de ned along similar lines. We brie y sketch the de nition here, and refer the reader to MZ85, TW88, BD93] for more details. We start with S, which we assume is endowed with a topology that makes it a compact metric space. 3 Given a compact metric space X, let (X) denote the set of Borel probability measures on X. If we endow (X) with the topology of weak convergence of measures, then (X) is also a compact metric space. De ne a sequence of spaces X k , for k = 0; 1; 2; : : :, inductively, by taking X 0 = S and X k+1 = X k (X k ) n . Thus, X k+1 = X 0 (X 0 ) n (X 1 ) n : : : (X k ) n :
A B1. For all k > 1, the probability measure b k (i) assigns probability 1 to the subspace of X k?1 consisting of sequences hc 0 ; : : : ; c k?1 i with c k?1 (i) = b k?1 (i). This says that agent i knows his own probability assignment.
B2. For all k > 1, the probability measure b k?1 (i) is the marginal of b k (i) on X k?2 .
3
The assumption that S is a compact metric space is made in TW88]. Variants of this assumption were used in BE79, BD93, MZ85] .
The assumption and all its variants are trivially true if S is nite, which is often a reasonable assumption in practice. FHV91] for when an agent considers a world possible; these are then shown to be equivalent. We already saw one de nition. Let w be a k-world. Recall that agent i considers w possible in a knowledge structure f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i if w 2 f k (i). There is, however, another notion of possibility. We say that agent i considers w possible 0 in f if w is a pre x of some knowledge structure f 0 such that f i f 0 ; i.e., w is the pre x of a knowledge structure that agent i cannot distinguish from f. The following theorem assures us that the two notions of \possible world" are identical.
Theorem 3.1: FHV91] Agent i considers a k-world w possible in a knowledge structure f i agent i considers w possible 0 in f.
The notion \possible 0 " can be thought of as an external notion of possibility. It says that we consider each of the knowledge structures f 0 that i considers possible (that is, each knowledge structure f 0 in i's view f i ) and take its k-pre x. The other notion (\possible") is an internal notion:
we consider every k-world that i considers possible, by \looking inside" the knowledge structure (at level k). Theorem 3.1 tells us that the external and internal notions coincide. Consequently, agent i knows a k-event E in f precisely when f i is consistent with E; that is, the k-pre x of every knowledge structure in f i is in E. In other words, it does not matter whether we de ne knowledge in terms of possible worlds or in terms of possible 0 worlds. Now consider an (! + 1)-world f 0 = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : : ; f ! i, extending the knowledge structure f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i. We frequently abuse notation in such situations by writing hf; f ! i as an abbreviation for f 0 . As before, there are two ways that we can de ne \the knowledge structures that agent i considers possible in f 0 ". One way is to say that agent i considers the knowledge structure g possible in f 0 precisely if g 2 f ! (i). Another way is to say that agent i considers the knowledge structure g possible 0 in f 0 precisely if g is the pre x of some (! + 1)-world g 0 such that f 0 i g 0 .
It is shown in FHV91] that these two ways are not equivalent; the set of knowledge structures that agent i consider possible 0 in f 0 is precisely f i ; this is always a superset of f ! (i), but equality need not hold. In fact, knowledge structures do not fully describe the agents' knowledge; there are distinct (! + 1)-worlds that agree on the rst ! levels (an example, taken from FHV91], is given in Example 3.10).
This \discrepancy" can also be described in terms of knowledge of !-events, which are sets of !-worlds. We can de ne knowledge of an !-event E in an (! +1)-world f, in two ways. We say that agent i knows E in f if every !-world g that agent i considers possible in f is in E, i.e., f ! (i) E. We say that agent i knows 0 E in f if every !-world g that agent i considers possible 0 in f is in E, i.e., f i E. Note that there is possibly a di erence between knowing and knowing 0 ; if f ! (i) is a proper subset of f i then agent i knows but does not know 0 the !-event f ! (i). In this sense, knowledge structures may not fully describe the agents' knowledge.
The fact that knowledge structures may not fully describe the agents' knowledge should be contrasted with the situation for belief structures, which completely describe the agents' beliefs. Thus, in the case of belief worlds, the rst ! levels of the hierarchy completely describe the agents' beliefs, which is not the case for knowledge worlds. To understand this di erence better, the rst question we want to examine here is when knowledge structures completely describe the agents' knowledge.
Three characterizations of adequacy
To answer this question of when knowledge structures completely describe the agents' knowledge, we rst need to formalize it. If ! is an ordinal, then we say that a knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' -knowledge if there is a unique extension of f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; f 2 ; : : :i to a ( +1)-world hf 0 ; f 1 ; f 2 ; : : : ; f i. In particular, f characterizes the agents' !-knowledge if the \next" level f ! is uniquely determined. We say that a knowledge structure f (completely) characterizes the agents' knowledge if it characterizes the agents' -knowledge for every !, that is, if all extensions of f are determined. This de nition captures the intuition that the rst ! levels determine the agents' knowledge. As we have already observed, the result of BE79, MZ85] implies that all belief structures characterize the agents' beliefs in this sense. An example is given in Remark 3.11 where a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' !-knowledge, but not the agents' knowledge.
There is a very simple case where a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' knowledge: namely, when there is only one agent. In fact, in this case, the rst two levels (f 0 and f 1 ) completely characterize the agent's knowledge: (1) , and condition K2 tells us that h 1 (1) = f 1 (1), so h 1 = f 1 (since agent 1 is the only agent). Conversely, if h 0 2 f 1 (1), then condition K3 tells us that there is some h 1 such that hh 0 ; h 1 i 2 f 2 (1), and condition K2 tells us that h 1 (1) = f 1 (1), so again h 1 = f 1 . We have shown that f 2 (1) = fhh 0 ; f 1 i j h 0 2 f 1 (1)g. Similarly, g 2 (1) = fhh 0 ; g 1 i j h 0 2 g 1 (1)g. So, since f 1 = g 1 , it follows that f 2 (1) = g 2 (1), and so f 2 = g 2 .
We shall shortly provide a necessary and su cient condition for a knowledge structure to characterize the agents' knowledge when there are two or more agents. First, we give a necessary and su cient condition for a knowledge structure to characterize the agents' !-knowledge.
Assume that agent i considers the k-world w possible in the knowledge structure f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i, that is, w 2 f k (i). By Theorem 3.1, it follows that there is a knowledge structure g such that w is a pre x of g and f i g. We say that w is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. (with respect to) f if there is a unique such knowledge structure g.
We need another de nition before we prove our next theorem. Let f be a -world and let i be an agent. De ne the (one-step) no-information extension f + of f to be the ( + 1)-world hf; f i extending f such that f (i) = f i for each agent i. By results in FHV91], the no-information extension is indeed a ( + 1)-world. Intuitively, the one-step no-information extension f + describes what each agent knows at depth , assuming that \all that each agent knows" is already described by f. Thus, in this case f (i) is the set of all -worlds that are compatible with i's lower-depth knowledge.
Theorem 3.3: A knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' !-knowledge i for each agent i and each knowledge structure g 6 = f such that f i g, some nite pre x of g is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. f. Proof: ()): Assume that there is some agent i and some knowledge structure g di erent from f such that f i g, but no nite pre x of g is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. f. Therefore, for every nite pre x of g, there is some knowledge structure h with that pre x such that f i h and h 6 = g. Let f + = hf; f ! i be the one-step no-information extension of f. Thus, f ! (i) = f i . In particular, g 2 f ! (i). De ne f 0 ! by letting f 0 ! (i) = f ! (i) ? fgg, and f 0 ! (j) = f ! (j) if j 6 = i. It is easy to check that f 0 = hf; f 0 ! i is an (! + 1)-world: the correctness condition K1 holds, since g 6 = f; the introspection condition K2 is immediate; and the extendibility condition K3 holds, since for every nite pre x of g there is some h with that pre x, such that h i f and h 6 = g. Since f 0 6 = f + , it follows that f does not characterize the agents' !-knowledge.
((): Let hf; f ! i be an arbitrary (! + 1)-world extending f. We shall show that f ! (i) = f i for each agent i. We rst show that f ! (i) f i . Assume that h = hh 0 ; h 1 ; : : :i 2 f ! (i); we must show that h 2 f i . By the extendibility condition K3, we have h <k 2 f k (i) for each positive integer k. Thus, by K2, we have that h k?1 (i) = f k?1 (i) for all k 2. It follows that h i f. That is, h 2 f i , as desired.
Conversely, assume that g 2 f i ; we must show that g 2 f ! (i). If g = f, then g 2 f ! (i), by condition K1. So assume that g 6 = f. By assumption, some nite pre x w of g is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. f. This tells us that g is the unique member of f i with pre x w. By condition K3, there must be some g 0 2 f ! (i) with pre x w. Since f ! (i) f i , it follows that g 0 2 f i . Since g 0 2 f i and g 0 has pre x w, it follows by uniqueness that g 0 = g, and that so g 2 f ! (i), as desired.
Thus, f ! (i) = f i . We have shown that f ! is uniquely determined by f, since f ! (i) = f i for each agent i. So f characterizes the agents' !-knowledge. Theorem 3.3, which will turn out to be quite useful, gives a sense in which knowledge at nite levels determines when the agents' !-knowledge is \forced" to a unique value.
We might hope that if a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' !-knowledge, then it completely characterizes the agents' knowledge. Unfortunately, this is not the case. For example, there is a knowledge structure with two agents that characterizes the agents' !-knowledge and has two extensions to (! + 1)-worlds: Roughly speaking, in one of these, agent 2 knows that agent 1's !-knowledge is characterized, and in the other extension agent 2 does not know this. Another example of a knowledge structure that characterizes the agents' !-knowledge but does not characterize the agents' knowledge is given in Remark 3.11. As the next result shows, a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' knowledge i it is common knowledge that the rst ! levels characterizes the agents' !-knowledge. To make this precise, we need some more de nitions.
Let f and g be knowledge structures. We say that g is reachable from f (by a path of length r) if there are knowledge structures h 0 ; : : : ; h r such that f = h 0 , g = h r , and for all j < r, we have h j i h j+1 for some agent i. There is a close connection between reachability and common knowledge. For example, it can be shown that an event E S is common knowledge in f i E holds at each knowledge structure reachable from f. (See Aum76, HM92] for analogous results in the context of Aumann structures, and TW88] for an analogous result in the context of belief structures.)
The following two theorems give necessary and su cient conditions for a knowledge structure to characterize the agents' knowledge. Theorem 3.4: A knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' knowledge i every knowledge structure reachable from f characterizes the agents' !-knowledge. Proof: See Appendix A.
Using Theorem 3.4, it is not hard to provide examples of knowledge structures that do and knowledge structures that do not characterize the agents' knowledge. For example, given a k-world w, de ne (as in FHV91]) the no-information extension w of w by repeatedly taking one-step no-information extensions. Informally, w is the knowledge structure where all each agent knows is what is already described by w. It can be shown from the construction of the one-step noinformation extension that w does not characterize the agents' !-knowledge. We shall see another example later (Example 3.10) where the knowledge structure does not characterize the agents' !-knowledge. An example of a knowledge structure that characterizes the agents' knowledge is one where the state of nature is common knowledge. This is a knowledge structure f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i where every f k (i) is a singleton set. We leave to the reader the straightforward veri cation that such a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' knowledge.
As we noted, there exist knowledge structures that characterize the agents' !-knowledge, but do not completely characterize the agents' knowledge. Rather surprisingly, it turns out that if a knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' knowledge through the rst ! + ! levels (that is, if f characterizes the agents' (! + k)-knowledge for every natural number k), then f completely characterizes the agents' knowledge. Theorem 3.5: A knowledge structure characterizes the agents' knowledge i it characterizes the agents' knowledge through the rst ! + ! levels.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We now provide another characterization of knowledge structures that characterize the agents' knowledge, in the case where the state space S is nite. Theorem 3.6: Assume that there are only nitely many states of nature. A knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' knowledge i g i is nite for every knowledge structure g reachable from f and every agent i.
If f is a knowledge structure, then let G f be a graph whose nodes are all knowledge structures reachable from f, such that there is an edge between two nodes g and h i g i h for some agent i. Then Theorem 3.6 says that f characterizes the agents' knowledge i G f has nite fanout at every node. This is closely related to Theorem 5.7 of Fag94], which gives a similar nite fanout characterization for structures like knowledge structures, except that they do not satisfy condition K1.
A su cient condition for characterizing the agents' knowledge
To gain a better understanding of the issue of characterization of knowledge, we now consider a simple su cient condition on knowledge structures that guarantees characterization of the agents' knowledge. Let f be a knowledge structure. A world is reachable from f if it is a pre x of a knowledge structure that is reachable from f. Intuitively, a world w is reachable from f if some agent considers it possible that some agent considers it possible that some agent considers w possible. We say that it is common knowledge in f how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge if whenever w = hg 0 ; : : : ; g r i and w 0 = hg 0 agents' knowledge if there is a \commonly-known algorithm" for determining each agent's nite levels of knowledge from the state of nature. It can be easily shown that it is common knowledge in f how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge precisely if whenever g and g 0 are reachable from f, and the state of nature is the same in g and g 0 , then g = g 0 . The next lemma follows easily from this characterization.
Lemma 3.7: Assume that it is common knowledge in f how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge. Assume also that h is reachable from f. Then it is common knowledge in h how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge.
The next proposition gives us a simple su cient condition on a knowledge structure that guarantees that it characterizes the agents' knowledge.
Proposition 3.8: Assume that it is common knowledge in the knowledge structure f how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge. Then f characterizes the agents' knowledge. Proof: By Theorem 3.4, it su ces to show that if h is reachable from f, then h characterizes the agents' !-knowledge. Theorem 3.3 tells us that to show this, we need only show that for each agent i and each knowledge structure g = hg 0 ; g 1 ; : : :i 6 = h such that h i g, some nite pre x w of g is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. h. Let w be the pre x hg 0 i. By Lemma 3.7, it is common knowledge in h how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge. Therefore, if g 0 is a knowledge structure such that h i g 0 , and g 0 has pre x w, then g 0 = g. Hence, w is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. h, as desired.
The interest in Proposition 3.8 comes from the fact that the way an agent determines what states are possible (or, in the case of belief structures, the way an agent determines how to assign probabilities) clearly ultimately depends on circumstances external to the agent, including perhaps what the agent has observed, the agent's upbringing, and a myriad of other in uences. In many applications, the most natural way to model the state of nature will capture these external circumstances, and therefore it is common knowledge how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge. The following simple example, based on the coordinated attack problem discussed in HM90] (and later modi ed as the electronic mail game by Rubinstein Rub89]), may clarify this.
Example 3.9: There are three agents, 1, 2, and 3. Consider a fact p such as \the price of IBM stock is over $100". Suppose agents 1 and 3 discover whether or not p holds, and agent 2 does not. If p does not hold, then nothing happens. If p holds, then agents 1 and 2 start to communicate about p over an unreliable channel. First agent 1 tells agent 2 that p holds. If agent 2 receives the message, he sends an acknowledgment. If agent 1 receives the acknowledgment, he acknowledges the acknowledgment, and so on. If at any point a message is not received, there is no further communication. There is never any communication between agent 3 and the other two agents. We consider the system at some time after agent 1 discovers p. We also assume that agent 3 has no idea how much time has passed, so that, if p holds, he has no upper bound on the number of messages that may have been received by agents 1 and 2. We can thus take S to consist of p (the state where the negation p of p holds) and pairs of the form (p; k), k 0; intuitively, these are the states where p holds, k messages were received by 1 and 2, and a (k + 1) st message was sent by the recipient of the k th message (or by agent 1 if k = 0), but not received.
In this situation, it is common knowledge how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge. Intuitively, this is because once we know how many messages have been received, we can determine each agent's knowledge. For example, suppose that the state of nature is (p; 2), so that p holds and two messages have been received (thus far) between 1 and 2 (i.e., 2 received 1's initial message, and 1 received 2's acknowledgment). Then at the rst level, agent 1 considers the states (p; 2) and (p; 3) possible (since agent 1 does not know whether his acknowledgment to agent 2's last message was received by agent 2) and 2 considers the states (p; 1) and (p; 2) possible (since agent 2 does not know whether agent 1 received the last acknowledgment he sent). Agent 3 considers all states of the form (p; k), k 0 possible, since he knows p holds, but has no idea how many messages have passed between agents 1 and 2. It is not hard to see how we can continue this construction in a unique way, level by level. Since it is common knowledge how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge, it follows from Proposition 3.8 that each knowledge structure that arises in this scenario characterizes the agents' knowledge.
Before leaving this example, let us consider what knowledge the agents have in each of the knowledge structures that arise in this scenario. Let E be the set of states of nature of the form (p; k); intuitively, E corresponds to the event that \p holds". In (the knowledge structure that corresponds to) the state (p; 0), agent 1 knows E but agent 2 does not know that agent 1 knows E; in the state (p; 1), agent 2 knows that agent 1 knows E, but agent 1 does not know that agent 2 knows that agent 1 knows E; and so on. Thus, for none of these states does common knowledge of E ever hold between agents 1 and 2, where agents 1 and 2 are said to have common knowledge of E if both 1 and 2 know that both 1 and 2 know : : : that E holds (cf. the discussion of the coordinated attack problem in HM90]). Now consider agent 3. Informally, in every state agent 3 certainly knows that agents 1 and 2 do not have common knowledge of E (since they never attain common knowledge of E when communicating over an unreliable channel). He considers it possible, however, that agents 1 and 2 have arbitrarily deep knowledge of E (since agent 3 considers all the states (p; 0); (p; 1); (p; 2); : : : possible). More precisely, if f s is the knowledge structure associated with a state s 2 S, then in the unique extension hf s ; f s ! i of f s to an ! + 1-world (the extension is unique because f s characterizes the agents' knowledge), f s ! (3) consists of every knowledge structure f s 0 for s 0 2 S. Thus, agent 3 knows that E is not common knowledge among the other two agents, and considers it possible that they have arbitrarily deep knowledge.
While in simple examples it does seem reasonable to include enough information in the state of nature so that it is common knowledge how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge, in more complicated examples this becomes a serious modeling problem. For example, even if we accept that the sum total of an agent's upbringing, together with hereditary factors and all the agent's experience and observations, completely determines the agent's knowledge, it is not clear that we want to include all this information in the state of nature when modeling, say, a simple game. Once we leave it out, however, the knowledge structure may no longer adequately model the agents' knowledge, as the following example shows. We can denote the knowledge structures that arise in this example as f ?1 ; f 0 ; f 1 ; : : :. The knowledge structure f ?1 has as pre xes the worlds w j;?1 , for j = 1; 2; 3; : : :, and corresponds to the unique knowledge structure in the previous example where the state of nature is p. The knowledge structure f j has as pre xes the worlds w k;k?1 for 1 k j and w k;j for k > j, and corresponds to the knowledge structure in the previous example where the state of nature is (p; j). Notice that the knowledge structure f 1 with pre xes w 1;0 ; w 2;1 ; w 3;2 ; : : : does not arise in this situation (although it is easy to check that f 1 is indeed a well-de ned knowledge structure). Intuitively, f 1 corresponds to the situation where in nitely many messages passed between agents 1 and 2, a situation that is commonly known to be impossible. In f 1 , the event E (where p holds) is common knowledge among agents 1 and 2. Intuitively, it is because f 1 is commonly known to be impossible that agent 3 knows that agents 1 and 2 do not have common knowledge of E. Nevertheless, none of the knowledge structures where p holds that arise in this example capture the fact that f 1 is (commonly known to be) impossible. Consider any knowledge structure f j with j 0, and let f + j = hf j ; f ! i be the no-information extension of f j . It is not hard to see that f 1 2 f ! (3), so that in f + j , agent 3 does not know that agents 1 and 2 do not have common knowledge of E. Of course, there is another extension f 0 j = hf j ; f 0 ! i of f j such that f 1 = 2 f 0 ! (3). This shows that f j does not characterize the agents' !-knowledge. This provides the example that we promised after Theorem 3.4 of a knowledge structure that does not characterize the agents' !-knowledge. By contrast, the knowledge structure that arises in Example 3.9 does characterize the agents' knowledge. when we replace \it is common knowledge how the state of nature determines the agents' knowledge" by \for some k, it is common knowledge how level k determines the agents' knowledge."
We can further strengthen Proposition 3.8 by further weakening the hypotheses: Let f be a knowledge structure, and let k be a xed natural number. We say that agent i knows in f that level k determines the agents' knowledge if whenever g = hg 0 f is a knowledge structure where for some k, it is common knowledge that level k determines the agents' knowledge, then f characterizes the agents' knowledge. This is because every knowledge structure reachable from f then characterizes the agents' !-knowledge, and so by Theorem 3.4, it follows that f characterizes the agents' knowledge.
Notice that the de nition of common knowledge that level k determines the agents' knowledge is di erent from our earlier de nition of common knowledge how level k determines the agents' knowledge. It is common knowledge in f that level k determines the agents' knowledge if in every knowledge structure g reachable from f, every agent knows that level k determines the agents' knowledge. It is possible, however, that there are two di erent knowledge structures g and g 0 , both reachable from f, that have the same pre x through level k. This cannot happen if it is common knowledge how level k determines the agents' knowledge. It is not hard to show that \common knowledge how" implies \common knowledge that".
An alternative view of adequacy
How does the characterization of knowledge in knowledge structures relate to the characterization of beliefs in belief structures? To answer this question, we now provide another necessary and su cient condition for when a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' knowledge. This time, we consider when it is the case that there is enough information in a knowledge structure to determine what other knowledge structures each agent considers possible. for extensions hf; f ! i of f to an (! + 1)-world? If f characterizes the agents' knowledge, then P would be precisely f i = fg j f i gg. On the other hand, if agent i has more information than is described in f, then he might consider only some proper subset of f i possible. Notice that if w 2 f k (i) for some k, so that agent i considers w possible, then P should contain some knowledge structure f 0 such that w is a pre x of f 0 . We say that a set P of knowledge structures is a coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f if P1. f 2 P. P2. P f i .
P3. If w 2 f k (i) for some k > 0, then there is a knowledge structure f 0 2 P such that w is a pre x of f 0 . Condition P1, which is analogous to the correctness condition K1, says that the agent considers f as a possibility. Condition P2, which is analogous to condition K2, says that the agent has at least as much information as is contained in f. Condition P3, which is analogous to condition K3, is an extendibility condition.
Let P be a set of knowledge structures, and let f and f 0 be members of P. It is easy to see that P is a coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f i P is a coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f 0 . Therefore, we say that P is a coherent set of possibilities for agent i if it is a coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f, for every f 2 P.
As expected, agent i always has at least one coherent set of possibilities at f, namely f i . Lemma 4.1: f i is a coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f. Proof: Condition P1 holds, since f i f. Condition P2 holds, since f i f i . Condition P3 follows immediately from Theorem 3.1.
If there is only one coherent set of possibilities at f for each agent i, then we might expect that f characterizes the agents' !-knowledge. The following result shows that this is indeed the case. Theorem 4.2: The knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' !-knowledge i there is only one coherent set of possibilities at f for each agent i. Proof: Assume that there is only one coherent set of possibilities at f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i for each agent i. Let hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : : ; f ! i be an (! + 1)-world that extends f. It follows easily from the consistency conditions on (! + 1)-worlds that f ! (i) is a coherent set of possibilities at f, for each agent i. So by assumption, f ! (i) is uniquely determined by f, for each agent i. Therefore, by de nition, the knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' !-knowledge.
Conversely, assume that there are two distinct coherent sets of possibilities at f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i, for some agent i. Let us denote these two distinct coherent sets by P and P 0 . De ne f ! by letting f ! (i) = P, and f ! (j) = f j for j 6 = i. Similarly, de ne f 0 ! by letting f 0 ! (i) = P 0 , and f 0 ! (j) = f j for j 6 = i. It is straightforward to verify that hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : : ; f ! i and hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : : ; f 0 ! i are distinct extensions of f. Therefore, f does not characterize the agents' !-knowledge.
Thinking in terms of coherent sets of possibilities gives us some insight into why belief structures do characterize the agents' beliefs. We say that a set P of knowledge structures is limit closed if a knowledge structure g = hg 0 ; g 1 ; : : :i is in P whenever, for all k, there is a knowledge structure g k 2 P such that hg 0 ; : : : ; g k i is a pre x of g k . Thus, P is limit closed if, whenever every nite pre x of a knowledge structure appears in P, then the whole knowledge structure appears in P.
The next result shows that f i is limit closed. A coherent set of possibilities need not, however, be limit closed in general. As the next result shows, if it is limit closed, then it must in fact be f i . Proposition 4.3: P is a limit-closed coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f i P = f i .
Proof: By Lemma 4.1, f i is a coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f. To show that it is limit closed, let g = hg 0 ; g 1 ; : : :i be a knowledge structure such that for all k, there is a knowledge structure g k 2 f i where hg 0 ; : : : ; g k i is a pre x of g k . We want to show that f i g. Since f i g k , we have f k (i) = g k (i). Since this is true for every k, it follows that f i g. So g 2 f i , as desired.
For the converse, suppose that P is a limit-closed coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f. Since P f i by condition P2, we need only show that f i P. Assume that g = hg 0 ; g 1 ; : : :i 2 f i , that is, f i g. We want to show that g 2 P. By K1, for all k we have hg 0 ; : : : ; g k i 2 g k+1 (i). Since f i g, we must have g k+1 (i) = f k+1 (i). Hence, for all k, we have hg 0 ; : : : ; g k i 2 f k+1 (i). It follows from P3 that for every k, there is a knowledge structure g k 2 P such that hg 0 ; : : : ; g k i is a pre x of g k . Since P is limit closed, we have that g 2 P, as desired. Limit closure can be viewed as a continuity condition and, as we have shown, it is essentially this continuity that is necessary for knowledge structures to characterize the agents' knowledge. Since the results of BE79, MZ85] show that all belief structures characterize the agents' beliefs, we would expect there to be some continuity condition implicit in the construction of belief structures. As Lipman Lip91] observed, the operator used in constructing belief structures can be viewed as a continuous operator. As we now show, this continuity arises from the fact that probability measures are assumed to be countably additive. (We remark that the view of countable additivity as a continuity condition is quite standard.) Limit closure says that if all nite pre xes of a knowledge structure are considered possible, then so is the knowledge structure itself. Analogously, it follows from countable additivity that the probabilities of the nite pre xes of a belief structure determine the probability of the belief structure.
We now show that without countable additivity of probability measures, it would not necessarily be the case that such (modi ed) belief structures completely characterize the agents' beliefs. In particular, we give an example where the probability measure is only nitely additive, rather than countably additive, and where the resulting belief structure does not completely characterize the agents' beliefs. The de nition of belief structures remains unchanged, except that we now allow probability measures that are only nitely additive, and not necessarily countably additive. Example 4.5: Our example is a variant of Example 3.10. Again we have two possible states of nature, p and p, and three agents, 1, 2, and 3. Agents 1 and 3 nd out whether or not p is true, while 2 does not. Initially, agent 2 considers p and p equally likely. If p is true, then agents 1 and 2 start to communicate. Suppose that it is common knowledge that agents 1 and 2 assign probability 1=2 to the (k +1) st message arriving, given that k messages have arrived, while agent 3 assigns probability 1 to the (k + 1) st message arriving, given that k messages arrive. Intuitively, agent 3's beliefs are incompatible with those of agents 1 and 2. Moreover, we assume (quite unrealistically!) that (it is commonly known that) the time for the k th message to arrive is 1=2 k . Thus, all communication has ended by time 1. We now consider the agents' beliefs at time 1.
In a fashion analogous to Example 3.10, we can construct nite pre xes of belief structures by induction on length. In fact, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the pre xes of length k of belief structures that now arise and the k-worlds that we constructed in Example 3.10.
Again, there are two pre xes of length 1, namely h pi and hpi, which we now denote v 1;?1 and v 1;0 respectively. There are three possible pre xes of length 2, analogous to the three 2-worlds in If we consider only countably additive probability measures, then the results of BE79, MZ85] tell us that there is. In fact, it is easy to see directly that this is so. For suppose that hb j ; b ! i is such an extension. Recall that when we considered extensions of f j , what caused problems was f ! (3).
But if we consider countably additive measures, then b ! (3) is determined. Since agent 3 is certain that all messages arrive, b ! (3) places probability 1 on the belief structure b 1 , since it must place probability 0 on b j for j 6 = 1, by the consistency constraints. This is no longer the case if we move to nitely additive measures. For each 2 0; 1], we now show that there is a nitely additive measure that places probability 0 on b j for all j 6 = 1 and probability on b 1 . This follows from the well-known result that there exists a nitely additive probability measure on the integers that assigns probability 0 to each nite subset ]. For completeness, we sketch the proof here.
Given a set U, a lter F on U is a nonempty set of subsets of U such that 1. ; = 2 F, 2. F is closed under nite intersections, so that if A; B 2 F, then A \ B 2 F, 3. F is closed under supersets, so that if A 2 F and A B, then B 2 F.
An ultra lter on U is a lter that is not a proper subset of any other lter. It is easy to show that if F is an ultra lter on U and if A U, then either A or its complement is in F, but not both BS74, Lemma 3.1]. It is also easy to see that if u 2 U, then F u = fA U : u 2 Ag is an ultra lter on U. Ultra lters of the form F u are called principal ultra lters. It is well-known that every in nite set has a nonprincipal ultra lter BS74, Lemma 3.8], that is, an ultra lter where no member is a singleton set. We leave it to check that is indeed a nitely additive probability measure. Clearly (fb 1 g) = and (fb j g) = 0 for j 6 = 1. Finally, it is easy to see that there is an extension hb j ; b ! i of b j such that b ! (3) = . In particular, it follows that if we consider nitely additive probabilities, then the rst ! levels of a belief structure do not characterize the agents' beliefs.
Adequacy revisited
We have seen that, in general, knowledge structures do not characterize the agents' knowledge. How serious a problem is this? That depends on the events we are interested in. As shown in FHV91], if we are interested only in common knowledge of events, then knowledge structures are indeed adequate, even if they do not characterize the agents' knowledge. But having the same common knowledge is not the same as having the same information. For more complicated events, we need to go further out in the hierarchy. These questions are addressed in FHV91] in a logic-theoretic framework; we reconsider them here in an event-based setting. Our results also give us a better understanding of the relationship between Aumann structures and knowledge structures.
One way to approach the adequacy issue is to consider an Aumann structure with F(S), the set of knowledge structures over S, the set of states of nature, as its state space. (Brandenburger and Dekel BD93] use an analogous construction, except, for them, the state space of the Aumann structure is the set of belief structures over S.) Given, however, that knowledge structures do not completely describe the agents' knowledge, it does not seem right to take the state space to be F(S). Instead, we consider a more general framework. Let us consider an Aumann structure with state space T such that every state in t 2 T is associated with a knowledge structure f t 2 F(S). Intuitively, we can think of the knowledge structure f t as de ning the agents' knowledge at state t, through the rst ! levels. Let : T ! F(S) be the mapping such that (t) = f t . We allow a knowledge structure to be associated with more than one state; since, as we have shown, knowledge structures do not in general completely characterize the agents' knowledge, there may be two states of the world where the agents' knowledge through the rst ! levels are identical, although the agents' knowledge di er in the two states. We say that a partition K i of T is coherent (with respect to ) if, for every state t 2 T, the set of knowledge structures associated with the states in K i (t) form a coherent set of possibilities for agent i. Intuitively, since the knowledge structures associated with the states describe the nite levels of knowledge of the agents, we would expect the partitions to respect this knowledge and therefore be coherent. We say that A = (T; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ) is a coherent Aumann structure based on (S; T; ) if each of K 1 ; : : : ; K n is coherent with respect to . We may still have a lot of freedom in de ning partitions in a coherent Aumann structure. We now examine the e ect of de ning di erent partitions. Our goal is to understand whether de ning di erent partitions of T can a ect the knowledge of the agents in the resulting Aumann structures. Note that there are two state spaces involved in Aumann structures where the states are associated with knowledge structures from F(S): the state space S for the knowledge structures and the state space T for the Aumann structure. We identify an event E S with the set of all states t 2 T such that the state of nature in f t is in E. Let A 1 = (T; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ) and A 2 = (T; K 0 1 ; : : : ; K 0 n ) be two coherent Aumann structures based on (S; T; ). Assume E S. A priori, the event C(E) could be di erent in A 1 and A 2 , since in A 1 , we use the partition K i to determine the K i operator, whereas in A 2 we use K 0 i . Intuitively, since knowledge structures do not characterize the knowledge of the agents, di erent partitions may result in di erent common knowledge by the agents. We use the notation C A (and, similarly, K A i ) when we want to emphasize that we are considering the operators C and K i determined by the partitions in Aumann structure A. The next theorem shows that if A 1 and A 2 are both coherent (and use the same association of states to knowledge structures), then C A 1 (E) = C A 2 (E).
Theorem 5.1: If A 1 and A 2 are coherent Aumann structures based on (S; T; ) and E S then
Proof: This result follows immediately from Theorem 5.2 below.
Theorem 5.1 can be viewed as saying that there is a precise sense in which knowledge structures do completely characterize the common knowledge that agents have regarding events de ned by subsets of S.
We are often interested, however, not just in common knowledge of events de ned by subsets of S, but in common knowledge of more complicated events. For example, we might be interested in the fact that it is common knowledge that agent 3 does not know that a message was sent from agent 1 to agent 2. If the state space S is de ned by events of the form \a message was sent from agent i to agent j", then typically the event \agent 3 does not know that a message was sent from agent 1 to agent 2" is not an event in S, so Theorem 5.1 does not apply. Furthermore, common knowledge is just one aspect of an agent's information. Agent 1 might know that agent 2 knows that a message arrived, without this fact being common knowledge. Nevertheless, this could well be an important piece of information. We can strengthen the previous result so that it deals with common knowledge of events that are not necessarily de ned by subsets of S, and also deals with knowledge that is not common knowledge.
Suppose A is a coherent Aumann structure based on (S; T; ). We can de ne the ck-events over S in A, denoted ck A (S), as the result of starting with the events de ned by subsets of S, and then closing o under complementation, nite intersection, and the knowledge and common knowledge operators. Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 5.1 tells us that knowledge structures characterize common knowledge that agents have regarding events de ned by subsets of S. Theorem 5.2 tells us even more; knowledge structures in fact characterize knowledge and common knowledge of more complicated events, obtained from events that are subsets of S and closing under complementation, nite intersection, and the knowledge and common knowledge operators. As was suggested in Example 3.10, the situation changes when we consider common knowledge among coalitions of agents. We can de ne a coalition common knowledge operator C G in Aumann structures, for every coalition G of agents, along the same lines as we de ned the common knowledge operator. Namely, we de ne the operator O G (\everyone in coalition G knows") on events by taking O G (E) to be the intersection over i 2 G of the events K i (E). The event C G (E) is then the intersection of the events O G (E), O G (O G (E)), and so on. The common knowledge operator C is the special case where G is taken to be all the agents.
Given an Aumann structure A 1 as above, we can de ne the cck-events of S in A 1 , denoted cck A 1 (S), to be the result of closing o the sets of events also under the coalition common knowledge operators. As Example 3.10 suggests, Theorem 5.2 fails if we replace the ck-events by the cckevents. 4 We can get an analogue to Theorem 5.2 if we carry the construction of the hierarchy somewhat further into the ordinals. That is, we must consider -worlds, for > !. As we now show, if all we care about are the cck-events, then it su ces to take = ! 2 .
Let F ! 2 (S) consist of all ! 2 -worlds over S. We say that P F ! 2 (S) is an ! 2 -coherent set of possibilities for agent i at f 2 F ! 2 (S) if, as before, f 2 P and P f i , and the obvious extension of P3 to level ! 2 holds: namely, if w 2 f (i) for some < ! 2 , then there is an ! 2 -world f 0 2 P such that w is a pre x of f 0 . We now consider Aumann structures each of whose states is associated with a knowledge structure in F ! 2 (S). We say that A = (T; K 1 ; : : : ; K n ) is an ! 2 -coherent Aumann structure based on (S; T; ) if each of K 1 ; : : : ; K n is ! 2 -coherent (using the obvious de nition of ! 2 -coherent for partitions). Proof: See Appendix B.
We remark that it can be shown that we actually need to consider structures of length ! 2 in order to get a result such as Theorem 5.3 (cf. Theorem 5.14 in FHV91]); that is, no smaller length su ces.
The results of this section help explain the apparent inconsistency mentioned in the introduction that, in spite of the connection between knowledge structures and Aumann structures in terms of knowledge and common knowledge, it still happens that knowledge structures are not an adequate description of an agent's knowledge. The point is that there are richer notions than simply knowledge and common knowledge, such as coalition common knowledge, that knowledge structures do not capture.
Counterfactual information
The focus so far has been on the issue of how much knowledge is captured by knowledge structures. As we observed in the introduction, however, knowledge structures also seem to be de cient in another manner, since they capture only worlds that are commonly known to be possible, while omitting worlds that are merely conceivable (such as ones where Ron Fagin is President). Clearly, this de ciency is orthogonal to the issue of the length of the hierarchy; it is a function of the de nition of knowledge structures, and not of the hierarchical approach. We now show how a generalization of knowledge structures can capture counterfactual information.
There has been a great deal of work done on modeling counterfactuals Lew73]. We present here a somewhat naive version of the standard approach. Our goal is not to provide a sophisticated model of counterfactuals, but to show that counterfactuals can be dealt with using the hierarchical approach.
The basic idea is to augment the de nition of knowledge assignments. As before, a 0th-order extended knowledge assignment f 0 is a member of S, that is, a state of nature (which, intuitively, corresponds to the \real world"). We call hf 0 i an extended 1-world. Assume inductively that extended -worlds have been de ned for all with 1 < . Let U be the set of all extended -worlds, for < . If 1 < , a th-order extended knowledge assignment is a pair f = (f p ; f c ) of functions that associates with each agent i a set f p (i) U of \possible" extended -worlds, and a set f c (i) U of \conceivable" extended -worlds such that f p (i) f c (i). Intuitively, the conceivable worlds include not only the possible worlds, but also those that the agent does not consider possible (such as a world where Ron Fagin is President). If is a limit ordinal, an extended -world is a sequence f = hf 0 ; f 1 ; : : :i of length such that for each < , we have that f is a th-order extended knowledge assignment and each -pre x (i.e., pre x of length ) is an extended -world. If = 0 + 1, there are again some consistency conditions that f 0 must satisfy, which extend the consistency conditions that knowledge worlds are required to obey.
What are the consistency conditions? Since f p is now playing essentially the same role as f did before, we require the following analogues of the original consistency conditions K1{K3: The reason we require condition K3 00 is that we think of each level as giving a ner and ner description. We do not necessarily require that the analogue of condition K2 0 hold. Intuitively, condition K2 0 says that the agents are introspective, and we do not require an agent to be introspective when considering conceivable worlds. Of course, we could easily impose such conditions on extended knowledge assignments, as well as further conditions to capture more sophisticated counterfactual information.
In this extended setting, we can again ask how far out into the ordinals we need to go. And, just as before, this will depend on the events of interest. There are cases when ! levels su ce, and others where we need to go much farther out into the ordinals.
Related results
There are a number of results of Fagin Fag94] and Heifetz and Samet HS93, HS98] that are related to ones proved here; we brie y describe them in this section.
It is shown in FHV91] that for every Aumann structure 5 A and state s of A, and for every ordinal , there is a -world that in a precise sense captures the knowledge of the agents through level at the state s. We say that the state s is represented by this -world. Fagin Fag94] de nes the distinguishing ordinal of an Aumann structure A to be the least ordinal such that whenever s and t are states of A that are represented by the same -world, then s and t are represented by the same -world for every . Heifetz and Samet refer to the distinguishing ordinal as the order of the partition space in HS93] and as the rank of the partition space in HS98]. Roughly speaking, we can think of the distinguishing ordinal of A as describing how far out in the knowledge hierarchy we need to go to completely describe the knowledge of agents in a state of A. Fagin A priori, it is not at all clear that such an ordinal exists. However, Fagin and, independently, Heifetz and Samet, showed that indeed, every Aumann structure has a uniqueness ordinal. In fact, if is the distinguishing ordinal and is the uniqueness ordinal, then + !. Since the distinguishing ordinal may be arbitrarily large, and since the uniqueness ordinal is at least as big as the distinguishing ordinal, it follows that the uniqueness ordinal may be arbitrarily large. This implies immediately the result stated (informally) in the introduction that no ordinal level of knowledge is su ciently large to describe completely an agent's uncertainty.
Concluding Remarks
As we have seen, the question of how far we have to extend the hierarchy to capture the agents' knowledge is a somewhat subtle one. Although the results of BE79, MZ85] show that ! levels su ce for belief structures, this result depends on countable additivity of probability functions, and does not hold if we consider knowledge rather than belief de ned probabilistically. 7 On the other hand, our results show that, even if we need to go possibly far beyond ! levels to (completely) characterize the agents' knowledge, for many events of interest, ! (or ! 2 ) levels su ce.
It could be argued that knowledge structures and knowledge worlds as de ned here are perhaps not the closest non-probabilistic analogue to belief structures. 8 A somewhat closer analogue would result if we replaced the correctness requirement K1 by the much weaker requirement f 0 (i) 6 = ;. This would result in a notion closer to the traditional philosopher's notion of belief. 9 The arguments given here apply without change to show that countable hierarchies still do not su ce if we use this nonprobabilistic notion of belief. Indeed, the arguments of Fag94] show that, in general, we need to again go to arbitrarily large ordinals to characterize the beliefs of agents. The key point is that without some sort of continuity condition (which probability gives us), states of nature rich enough to determine the agents' knowledge, or other equally strong conditions, we need to go well beyond the rst ! levels in general to characterize an agent's knowledge or belief.
A Proofs for Section 3
Before we prove Theorems 3.4 and 3.5, we need another lemma. We say that two ( + 1)-worlds hf 0 ; : : : ; f i and hg 0 ; : : : ; g i di er on agent i if g (i) 6 = f (i). 6 This is the term used by Fagin. Heifetz and Samet de ne this notion in terms of \knowledge morphisms". 7 We remark that Lip91] gives yet another example of a context in which we need to go beyond ! levels. 8 We thank one of the referees of the paper for bringing this point to our attention. 9 Technically, it would satisfy the axioms of the modal logic KD45 rather than S5; see FHMV95] for a discussion of these notions.
does not characterize the agents' (! + k + 1)-knowledge. Hence, e does not characterize the agents' (! + k + 2)-knowledge, which was to be shown. Now assume that j = i. We can assume that there are at least two agents, since otherwise, by Proposition 3.2, the knowledge structure is completely determined by its rst two levels. Let`be some agent other than agent i. We apply Lemma A.1, where the roles of i; j; f; g are played bỳ ; i; h 0 ; h 0 respectively, and nd that (h 0 ) + = h 1 has two extensions to (! + k + 2)-worlds that di er on agent`. We apply Lemma A.1 again, where the roles of i; j; f; g are played by i;`; (e 0 ) + ; (h 0 ) + respectively, and nd that (e 0 ) ++ has two extensions to (! + k + 3)-worlds that di er on agent i.
Hence, e does not characterize the agents' (! + k + 2)-knowledge, as desired. (3) ) (1): Let C be the set of knowledge structures reachable from f. We now show that every member of C characterizes the agents' knowledge. If not, then let be the minimal in nite ordinal such that there is some g 2 C that does not characterize the agents' -knowledge. By assumption, > !. Let g 0 = hg; g ! ; : : : ; g i be a ( +1)-world extending g. Let i be an arbitrary agent. We must have g ! (i) = g i , or else there would not be a unique extension of g to level !. By extendibility, g (i) must contain an extension (of the appropriate length) of each knowledge structure e 2 g i , and only such extensions. But there is at most one such extension for each e 2 g i ; this follows by de nition of and the fact that e 2 C (since e i g). So g (i) is uniquely determined. Since this is true for each agent i, it follows that g is uniquely determined, a contradiction.
The next lemma is a re nement of Theorem 3.3. The proof is obtained in a straightforward manner from the proof of Theorem 3.3. Lemma A.2: A knowledge structure f characterizes agent i's !-knowledge i for each knowledge structure g 6 = f such that f i g, some nite pre x of g is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. f.
We now prove Theorem 3.6, which is a second characterization of knowledge structures that characterize the agents' knowledge, in the case where the state space S is nite. We rst need a de nition that slightly re nes the notion of a knowledge structure characterizing the agents' !-knowledge. Let us say that a knowledge structure f characterizes agent i's !-knowledge if whenever hf; f ! i and hf; f 0 ! i are extensions of f to an (! + 1)-world, then f ! (i) = f 0 ! (i). Intuitively, this says that there is a unique possible value for f ! (i). Clearly, a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' !-knowledge i it characterizes agent i's !-knowledge for each agent i. The next lemma will be useful in our new characterization of when a knowledge structure characterizes the agents' This lemma is due to R. Simon (personal communication).
Lemma A.3: Assume that there are only nitely many states. Let f be a knowledge structure and i an agent. Then f i is nite i every member of f i characterizes agent i's !-knowledge.
Proof: Assume rst that f i is nite, and that g 2 f i . We must show that g characterizes agent i's !-knowledge. By Lemma A.2, it su ces to show that for each knowledge structure h 6 = g such that g i h (that is, such that h 2 f i ), some nite pre x of h is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. g. Since f i is nite, there is some positive integer k such that no two distinct members of f i have the same k-pre x. Therefore, if h 2 f i , then the k-pre x of h is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. g. This was to be shown. Conversely, assume that f i is in nite; we must show that some member of f i does not characterize agent i's !-knowledge. Since f i is in nite and S is nite, it follows by a K onig's Lemma argument that there is a sequence w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; : : : of worlds, where for each k:
1. w k is a k-world; 2. w k is a pre x of w k+1 ; and 3. w k has in nitely many distinct extensions to knowledge structures in f i . Let g be the knowledge structure whose k-pre x is w k for each k. Clearly, g 2 f i . Since f i is in nite, there is some member h of f i such that h 6 = g. We complete the proof by showing that h does not characterize agent i's !-knowledge. By Lemma A.2, it su ces to show that no nite pre x of g is i-uniquely extendible w.r.t. h. But this follows almost immediately from the de nition of g. Theorem 3.6: Assume that there are only nitely many states. A knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' knowledge i g i is nite for every knowledge structure g reachable from f and every agent i.
Proof: Assume rst that the knowledge structure f characterizes the agents' knowledge, that g is reachable from f, and that i is an agent. Then every member of g i is reachable from f. So by Theorem 3.4, every member of g i characterizes the agents' !-knowledge. So by Lemma A.3, it follows that g i is nite.
Conversely, assume that g i is nite for every knowledge structure g reachable from f and every agent i. By Lemma A.3, every member of g i , and in particular g itself, characterizes agent i's !-knowledge. This shows that g characterizes the agents' !-knowledge for every knowledge structure g reachable from f. So by Theorem 3.4, it follows that f characterizes the agents' knowledge. G ) k (R), for h = 1; 2, it easily follows (using part (a)) that C A 1 G (R) is closed and that C A 1 G (R) = C A 2 G (R). Notice that Lemma B.6 already su ces to prove Theorem 5.1. If we could only extend Lemma B.6 to show that closed sets were closed under complementation, we could then easily prove Theorem 5.2, even for events formed using the operator C G for an arbitrary subset G of agents. The complement of a closed set is not, however, necessarily a closed set. In fact, Example 3.10 shows that Theorem 5.2 is false if we can use the operator C G for any arbitrary subset G of agents.
Nevertheless, because it allows only C rather than C G for arbitrary G, Theorem 5.2 is true. To prove it, we need a collection of sets that is closed under complementation, nite intersection, and the application of C and K i . Before we de ne the appropriate notion, we collect a number of well-known general properties of the knowledge and common knowledge operators, the rst of which we already used in the course of proving Lemma B.6. We leave the proof of these properties to the reader. Lemma Proof: Lemma B. 3 says that cylinder sets are closed under nite union and complementation.
By parts (3) and (5) of Lemma B.7, so are xedpoint sets. Straightforward manipulation, using standard properties of complementation and union, shows that safe sets are also closed under nite union and complementation.
Suppose E = \ k j=1 (D j R j ) is a safe set. By parts (1) and (4) i (E). Finally, note that by parts (2) and (5) of Lemma B.7, C A 1 (E) = \ k j=1 (D j C A 1 (R j )). By Lemma B.6 and part (5) of Lemma B.7 (taking E 0 = ;), it follows that C A 1 (R j ) is a xedpoint set. So C A 1 (E) is a xedpoint set, and hence a safe set. Thus, safe sets are closed under application of C A 1 . Moreover, since C A 1 (R j ) = C A 2 (R j ) by Lemma B.6, we have C A 1 (E) = C A 2 (E).
Theorem 5.2 follows immediately from Proposition B.9, because every set in ck A 1 (S) is clearly safe. Proof: The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 5.2, but much simpler, so we just sketch the details here. Given an association of states in T with ! 2 -worlds, we de ne what it means for a set R T to be a -cylinder set in the obvious way, for an arbitrary < ! 2 , and take an extended cylinder set to be a -cylinder set for some < ! 2 . The same arguments as in Lemma B.3 show that extended cylinder sets are closed under nite union and complementation. Indeed, extended cylinder sets are also closed under a limited form of countable union and intersection: if R j is a j -cylinder set and there exists 0 < ! 2 such that j < 0 for j = 1; 2; 3; : : :, then \ j R j and j R j are also extended cylinder sets. The argument in Lemma B.4 shows that extended cylinder sets are closed under the application of K i and that K A 1 i (R) = K A 2 i (R) for an extended cylinder set R. Moreover, these arguments can be extended to show that extended cylinder sets are closed under the application of C G and that C A 1 G (R) = C A 2 G (R) for an extended cylinder set R. For if R is a -cylinder set for < ! 2 , then (O A 1 G ) k (R) is a ( + k)-cylinder set. Since + k < + ! < ! 2 , it follows by our earlier observation that C A 1 G (R) = \ k (O A 1 C ) k (R) is an extended cylinder set. Thus, every set in cck(A 1 ) is an extended cylinder set, and the result follows.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 uses the fact that whenever < ! 2 , then + ! < ! 2 . In fact, ! 2 is the least ordinal such that whenever < , then + ! < . It is because of our use of this property that we cannot replace ! 2 by any smaller ordinal in Theorem 5.3.
